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REVISITING BARTER UNDER THE CISG
Andrew J. Horowitz*
As the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(hereinafter “UNCITRAL”) circulated a draft of what eventually became the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods
(hereinafter “CISG”), it examined the need for uniform law with respect to
barter transactions.  At that time in 1978, various international organizations1
were concerned that, while barter transactions were infrequent at the domestic
level, such transactions carried growing importance in international trade.2,3
In 1979, the UNCITRAL Secretariat responded by issuing a report saying
that, while true barter remained relatively rare in international transactions,
barter-like transactions had become increasingly common.  However, the4
report concluded that it was unnecessary to create a uniform legal framework
specifically for barter  and that, with careful drafting, the then-draft CISG5
could be applied to complex barter-like transactions.6
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Yet, many commentators claim that the CISG was not intended to apply
to barter and barter-like transactions and that it lacks the necessary elements
to do so.  Others take the view that barter is not excluded by the CISG and that7
it can govern barter and barter-like transactions with some careful drafting.8
Published jurisprudence is limited in this area, but there are cases supporting
both positions.9
This paper argues for the application of the CISG to barter and barter-like
transactions. First, this paper defines barter and examines the issue of the
definition of price under the CISG and how this creates an ambiguity with
respect to barter contracts. Next, it demonstrates how the CISG can be applied
to barter using the reciprocal contract doctrine. It then refutes the common
argument that the CISG lacks the necessary technical elements to govern
barter. A discussion follows that explains how disagreement on this topic is
often the result of domestic law. Last, it discusses the importance of barter to
international trade, justifying the application of the CISG to barter contracts.
WHAT IS BARTER?
In its simplest form, barter is the exchange of one commodity for another
without the use of money.  For example, if a farmer needs tomato seeds, he10
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16. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 4, at 37.
17. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 53, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/18, Annex 1 (Apr. 11, 1980) [hereinafter CISG].
18. See, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 7.
might find someone who is willing to trade him the seeds in exchange for
broccoli instead of paying with money. This would allow him to get the goods
he needs in exchange for the goods he has available without the need for
money.
Generally, when barter occurs in international trade, it is more complex
than the trade of one good for another.  It can involve trades of services, or11
partial barter, where a good is exchanged for another good plus some money.12
More important are complex and varied barter-like transactions where
performance occurs over a long period of time. Examples cited in the 1979
UNCITRAL report include the construction of a plant in exchange for a
portion of the plant’s output, licensing of intellectual property in exchange for
a portion of the goods produced under the license, and agreements by a
manufacturer to purchase materials from the buyer of the finished product.13
These transactions are motivated by a desire to mitigate risk by assuring
sources of materials or demand and reduce costs.  Also, a factor is counter-14
trade transactions, where barter is used to keep the balance of trade between
countries level.  While pure barter is relatively rare in the international15
arena,  this paper explores the applicability of CISG principles to pure barter,16
which can then be extrapolated to the more complex arrangements commonly
implicated in international trade.
PRICE NEED NOT BE DEFINED IN STRICTLY MONETARY TERMS
Though CISG Article 53 requires the buyer to pay the price for the
goods,  the word “price” is not defined by the Convention. Thus, there is17
ambiguity as to whether or not a price must be monetary. This for many
commentators  is the crux of the question of whether the CISG can be applied18
to barter, because, in a barter transaction, the price paid for the delivery of
something is the reciprocal delivery of something else.
In common English, “price” can refer to either monetary or non-monetary
consideration. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines price as being either
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“the quantity of one thing that is exchanged or demanded in barter or sale for
another . . . [or] the amount of money given or set as consideration for the sale
of a specified thing.”  In American legal usage, “price” is also inclusive of19
non-monetary consideration: Black’s Law Dictionary defines price as “the
amount of money or other consideration asked for or given in exchange for
something else; the cost at which something is bought or sold.”20
Commentators who oppose the application of the CISG to barter
transactions often base their opposition in defining “price” in Article 53 as
being monetary. For example, Franco Ferrari claims that arguments for the
application of the CISG to barter transactions neglect to “give due
consideration to Article 53 [of the] CISG which expressly mentions the
buyer’s obligation to ‘pay the price’, i.e. an element the lack of which
characterizes a barter transaction.”  The non-monetary nature of pure barter21
transactions appears to be the driving force for Ferrari’s rejection of the
application of the CISG. He states that the CISG does not apply to barter
transactions where the entire price is paid in goods.  Where the buyer makes22
part of the payment in money, however, the CISG might be applicable
depending upon whether the amount to be paid is greater than the value of the
goods exchanged and whether the parties intended to enter into a sales
contract rather than a counter-trade transaction.  This view is supported by23
a Russian case where the tribunal declined to apply the CISG because the
barter contract in question involved the exchange of goods without any
monetary payment.  The tribunal also stated that, for this reason, the contract24
in question was not a purchase contract.  While this argument is structured25
logically, it fails because neither Ferrari nor the Russian tribunal offers
justification for their exclusive definition of the word “price.” Rather,
Honnold argues that in leaving “price” undefined, the drafters of the CISG
implicitly endorsed its application to barter transactions.  Thus, it seems26
incongruous to exclude barter transactions merely because of the buyer’s
Article 53 obligation to “pay the price.”
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32. Id. at 1431–33.
THE RECIPROCAL CONTRACT DOCTRINE: APPLYING SALES LAW
TO BARTER TRANSACTIONS
The argument that the CISG can practically be applied to barter
transactions relies upon the reciprocal contract doctrine: that two contracts
exist as consideration for each other. Thus, the seller in one contract is
reciprocally the buyer in the other contract. In the first contract, party A (the
seller) agrees to sell good A to party B (the buyer) in exchange for the delivery
of good B. In the second contract, party B (now the seller) agrees to sell good
B to party A (now the buyer) in exchange for the delivery of good A.
U.C.C. 2-304 illustrates this doctrine, stating that if the price “is payable
in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller of the goods which he is to
transfer.”  This is exemplified in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied27
Chemical Nuclear Products, Inc.  Commonwealth Edison agreed to purchase28
nuclear fissile material from Allied Chemical in exchange for Allied Chemical
taking and reprocessing Commonwealth Edison’s irradiated fuel.  When a29
dispute arose, the court ruled that the traded-in irradiated fuel was not merely
part of the purchase price for the fissile material, but rather it was a reciprocal
good purchased by Allied Chemical from Commonwealth Edison.  Thus, for30
the purposes of determining the rights of the parties, Allied Chemical was the
buyer of the traded-in fuel, and Commonwealth Edison was the seller.  The31
court then proceeded to award seller’s damages to Commonwealth Edison.32
Reciprocal Contracts and the CISG
Though the CISG does not specifically enumerate the reciprocal contract
doctrine, it can be implied so long as “price” under CISG Article 53 is
interpreted as being nonmonetary, as the price paid under Article 53 in a
reciprocal contract situation is the delivery of something under another
contract. As this paper demonstrates infra, once the reciprocal contract
doctrine is implied into the CISG, its provisions can very easily be applied to
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barter transactions. Furthermore, in the 1979 UNCITRAL report, the
secretariat explains that barter-like transactions could be conducted under the
CISG using reciprocal contracts, though it did suggest a scheme under which
prices would be described in monetary terms.33
The reciprocal contract theory has been applied to barter transactions
under the CISG. In a Russian case involving the non-delivery of goods to a
Hungarian party by a Russian party after the Hungarian party had already
delivered reciprocal goods, the tribunal applied reciprocal contract theory to
rule on the case.  The tribunal treated the Hungarian party as the buyer of the34
undelivered Russian goods,  and awarded buyer’s damages under CISG35
Article 45(1)(b).36
In a Chinese case, the court explicitly recognized the reciprocal contracts
that formed a barter transaction under the CISG in a case concerning the trade
of Sesame by a Chinese party to a Jordanian party for urea.  In a Ukrainian37
barter case, the court applied the CISG and awarded monetary damages based
on the market value of the goods not delivered, implicitly applying the
reciprocal contract doctrine.  In another Russian barter case involving a38
Cypriot party, the tribunal explicitly applied the reciprocal contract doctrine
and awarded monetary damages based on the value of the non-delivered goods
as well as damages for interest and lost profits.  While published39
jurisprudence is unfortunately limited in this area, we can see that a
reasonable judicial precedent exists for implying the reciprocal contract
doctrine into the CISG to govern barter transactions.
Distinguished commentators also support this view. Enderlein and
Maskow suggest that the reciprocal contract theory should be used to apply
the CISG to linked operations including counter-purchase, buyback, and
barter.  Further, they suggest that ambiguities concerning performance and40
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counter performance can be resolved through careful drafting.  Bridge sees41
“no reason . . . to exclude the CISG if the two supplies of goods can sensibly
be rationalized as back to back sales with a set-off of the two prices due to
each supplier.”  Thus, the application of the reciprocal contract doctrine to42
the CISG enjoys strong, albeit not universal, support amongst tribunals and
commentators.
THE CISG HAS THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO GOVERN BARTER
TRANSACTIONS
Opposition to the application of the CISG to barter often stems from a
belief that the CISG does not contain the necessary technical elements to
effectively govern barter transactions. This is generally based upon the 1979
UNCITRAL report, which suggests that there might be some gaps in the CISG
that would frustrate its application to barter transactions.  Winship, for43
example, cites this report in claiming that the CISG lacks the requisite
elements to govern barter transactions.  Additionally, while not citing the44
UNCITRAL report, a Russian case declined to apply the CISG to a barter
transaction because “the text of the CISG gives no ground for concluding that
its provisions govern . . . barter transactions” and that “due to the existing
peculiarities of such [barter] transactions, not every provision of the
Convention could be applied to them.”45
The practical issues concerning applying the CISG to barter transactions
are not insurmountable. The main problem referred to when UNCITRAL
studied the issue of barter transactions during the drafting of the CISG was
remedies.  Specifically, the 1979 UNCITRAL report cites the seller’s right46
to make the tender of delivery conditional upon the buyer’s payment of the
price under CISG Article 58.  The report contemplates difficulties in deciding47
when failure to perform is serious enough to justify nonperformance by the
other party, when remedies are required because nonperformance is
insufficient, and when a party may conclude that the other party is unable to




51. CISG art. 50 (allows the buyer to reduce the price of nonconforming goods, regardless of
whether the price has already been paid, in proportion to the reduction in value caused by the
nonconformity, subject to the seller’s right to cure. Since order of performance is a non-issue, this is not
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perform due to a change in creditworthiness or conduct in preparing to
perform.  It is important to understand; however, that the report does not say48
that these difficulties render the CISG inapplicable to barter, rather that due
to the complexity of barter-like transactions, adjudicating these issues will be
more difficult and that parties would be wise to preempt difficulties through
careful drafting, especially in defining what constitutes a fundamental
breach.49
This paper illustrates how the CISG can be applied to some of these
situations using the reciprocal contract doctrine. Recall that under that
doctrine, each party is buyer and seller. For the purposes of resolving these
issues, it is most productive to focus on each party’s role as a seller. This
helps to avoid issues concerning the buyer’s obligation to pay the price and
results in more appropriate remedies.
Remedies in Situations of Part Performance
One of the main issues introduced in the 1979 UNCITRAL report is the
question of remedies, especially in the area of damages for part performance.50
The concern appears to be that the CISG does not have the elements necessary
to govern situations where one party wants to reduce the price under CISG
article 50,  or is seeking damages for nonperformance. For example, a51
German party contracts to sell sausage to an American party in exchange for
chickens. But then the deal goes sour when the chickens that arrive are not of
the grade contracted for, and the German party refuses to ship the final
shipment of sausage. Absent prior agreement, how would this problem be
addressed under the CISG?
This situation can be dealt with under existing CISG principles using the
basic premise that all goods have monetary value  and reciprocal contract52
principles. First, the court would have to determine the fair market value of
the sausage and chickens as contracted for. It is immaterial that these values
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might not be equal because the CISG affirms in Article 75 that damages
should allow a party to recover the benefit of his bargain in the event a
contract is avoided.  Then, the court should determine the value of each53
party’s partial performance, and determine the money damages due to each
side for the breach of the other party as though they were two separate
contracts. In doing this, the court would be best advised to treat both parties
as breaching sellers. That is, the American party is in breach for not delivering
the quality of chickens contracted for and the German party is in breach for
failure to deliver the sausage and each party can claim damages for breach by
the seller under CISG Article 45.  This is preferable to treating the parties as54
buyers in breach for failure to pay since it avoids issues relating to the buyer’s
obligation to pay the price under Article 53.
A potential ambiguity arises in determining when each party’s obligation
to perform is triggered under CISG Article 58,  which obligates the buyer to55
make payment when the seller places the goods or documents controlling the
goods at the buyer’s disposal and allows the seller to make tender of delivery
conditional upon the buyer’s payment.  In our example with the sausage and56
the chicken, it would be unclear as to which party is buyer and which is seller
for the purposes of Article 58 thus creating an ambiguity as to which party
must perform first to trigger the other party’s obligation to perform. The
easiest solution is for the parties to draft order of performance into their
agreement as suggested by Enderlein and Maskow.  Because of the phrase,57
“If the buyer is not bound to pay the price at any other specific time,”  Article58
58(1) only applies in the absence of agreement to the contrary.59
An alternative reading might be that performance by either party triggers
the other party’s obligation to perform, since the seller’s performance triggers
the buyer’s obligation to pay the price,  and price is defined in a barter60
contract as being the obligation to deliver on another contract under the
reciprocal contract theory, where each party is the seller of the goods he is to
deliver.
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The problem of whom is obligated to perform first remains if neither
party performs. Using our sausage-chicken hypothetical, an example of the
problem this could create is if the German party refuses to deliver the sausage,
causing the American party to refuse to deliver the chicken, which spoils in
a warehouse as a result. Theoretically, both parties would be liable for
damages for breach if neither performs,  provided that neither party was61
excused because of an impediment outside his control under Article 79.  Still,62
in this particular situation, it would seem that the American party should not
be able to collect damages for losses caused by its own failure to perform,
since it could have delivered the chicken, triggering the German party’s
Article 58(1) obligation to deliver the sausage. A court could potentially deny
damages to the American party under the principle of mitigation of damages,63
unless the American party believed that the German party was unable to
perform.  The potential for a party to be denied damages for failure to64
mitigate would create sufficient incentive for parties to perform thereby
activating the other party’s obligation to perform. Thus, though there is an
internal gap in the CISG as to who must perform first in a barter transaction,
it is unlikely to pose a substantial problem even if the parties fail to draft order
of performance into their agreement.
The Problem of Interest on Refunds under CISG Article 84
CISG Article 84(1) binds the seller to pay the buyer interest if he is
required to refund the price paid by the buyer.  While interest has been65
awarded in barter transactions,  it is problematic because the price paid by the66
buyer is the delivery of a good. It would be fairly simple to determine interest
based on the monetary value of the goods, but this would not effectively serve
the policy objectives of Article 84. According to the Secretariat Commentary,
Article 84 “reflects the principle that a party who is required to refund the
price or return the goods because the contract has been avoided . . . must
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account for any benefit which he has received by virtue of having had
possession of the money or goods.”  In the case of a seller holding the buyer’s67
money, the benefit he derived from the money is the use of the money during
the time that he held it, and it makes sense under the policy objectives of
Article 84 that he must return that benefit in the form of interest. But this
makes little sense in the case of a seller holding the buyer’s payment in goods.
Instead of viewing this party as a seller, it is best to treat him as a buyer who
is returning goods and thus obligated to compensate the other party for any
benefit he derived from holding the goods under Article 84(2).  This best68
meets the objectives of Article 84 in accounting “for any benefit which he has
received by virtue of having had possession of the money or goods.”69
POSITIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CISG TO BARTER TRANSACTIONS
ARE OFTEN INFLUENCED BY THE COMMENTATOR’S HOME LEGAL CULTURE
In analyzing this issue, we cannot ignore the effect that a court or
commentator’s home legal culture has on its analysis of the CISG. Indeed,
there is a disturbing “homeward trend” for courts around the world to interpret
the CISG through the lens of their own domestic law rather than existing
CISG jurisprudence from other countries.  Professor Honnold blames this on70
judges being intimately familiar with their domestic legal principles, which
they are conditioned to believe are fair and make rational sense.  The71
consequence is detriment to the uniformity that the CISG seeks to achieve.
In our situation concerning the definition of “price,” the homeward trend
is potentially complicated by the fact that the CISG is published in six official
languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish.  Under72
Article 101 of the CISG, each of the six texts are considered to be a “single
original” and “equally authentic.”  Thus, the question of whether barter is73
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75. See Sales: CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1582–1701 (Fr.); Exchanges: C. CIV. arts. 1702–1707
(Fr.), translated at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=22.
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79. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 8.
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METHODOLOGY 355 n.44 (André Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009), available at http://
www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/el-saghir.html [emphasis added].
83. Id. (stating that Egyptian commentators reject application of the CISG to barter because of the
governed by the CISG is potentially colored not only by the definition of
“price” in English, but also by linguistic nuances in five other languages.
Furthermore, commentators and courts around the world often base their
answers to the question of whether the CISG applies to barter on their local
law. While barter transactions are treated as sales under the U.C.C.,  the74
French Civil Code, upon which much of European law is based, establishes
a dichotomy between sales and exchanges as distinct entities, which are
governed by separate titles of the Civil Code.  Even so, the Civil Code75
analogizes exchanges to sales, applying the title concerning sales to all but a
few issues concerning exchanges.  The 1978 UNCITRAL report cites this76
provision in claiming that “in general, civil law systems provide expressly that
the provisions on sale apply, by analogy, also to barter.”  But the barter-77
specific provisions concerning remedies in the Civil Code concern the exact
issues that commentators point to when claiming that the CISG lacks the
necessary elements to govern barter transactions.  Thus, while American78
commentators generally support the application of the CISG to barter,79
commentators from civil law jurisdictions are divided.80
Additionally, the semantic difference between sales and exchanges under
civil law has been exacerbated by adaptations of the French Civil Code in
various countries. While the French Civil Code defines a “sale” as “an
agreement by which one person binds himself to deliver a thing, and another
to pay for it,”  the French-derived Egyptian Civil Code defines “sale” as “a81
contract whereby the seller undertakes to transfer to the buyer the ownership
of a thing or any other proprietary right in consideration of a price in
money.”  By using the word “money,” the Egyptian adaptation of the code82
explicitly excludes barter transactions from sales. Thus, Egyptian
Commentators reject the application of the CISG to barter.  Similarly, while83
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Article 1702 of the French Civil Code defines an “exchange” as “a contract
by which the parties give to each other one thing for another,”  the French-84
derived Louisiana Civil Code strengthens the distinction between sales and
exchanges by defining “exchange” as “a contract, by which the parties to the
contract give to one another, one thing for another, whatever it be, except
money; for in that case it would be a sale.”85
In the interest of fairness, the author of this paper is an American trained
to understand the law of commercial transactions in goods through the lens of
the U.C.C. and applying the reciprocal contract doctrine thus feels natural to
him. Commentators trained in different legal traditions could argue for or
against the applicability of the CISG to barter based on their home legal
traditions until they are blue in the face without making any headway towards
a consensus. To avoid this problem, this paper examines the merits of
applying the CISG to barter transactions for the purpose of promoting
uniformity in international trade.
APPLYING THE CISG TO BARTER TRANSACTIONS BENEFITS INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
The preamble to the CISG points to the establishment of a new economic
order based on the mutual economic benefit of global trade.  Further, it86
acknowledges that global trade plays a key role in developing friendly
relations between states.  It concludes that uniform laws governing87
international trade are essential to achieving these goals.88
This need for uniformity extends to barter transactions. Because of the
complexity of such transactions, especially when conducted across
international borders, it is beneficial for the parties to be able to rely on
uniform law. That said, since acceptance of the application of the CISG to
barter is far from widespread, it would be prudent for parties to specify an
alternate source of law in their drafting in case the court refuses to apply the
CISG.89
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USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2008, at 1B. Global grain prices more than doubled in some cases due to increased
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According to the 1978 UNCITRAL note, exchange transactions occur
more frequently in the international arena than they do domestically because
of their importance in easing foreign exchange difficulties.  At the time that90
UNCITRAL was studying this issue, barter was common in international
transactions involving countries with non-market economies.  For example,91
in 1970 Yugoslav Airlines contracted to pay approximately one sixth of the
$35 million price of seven McDonnell-Douglas jetliners in Yugoslav products
including hams, glassware, textiles and jewelry.  As was common, the reason92
for this barter transaction was twofold: first and foremost, the Yugoslavs had
limited foreign currency to spend and their domestic currencies were not
readily convertible.  Secondly, they wanted to boost their exports.93 94
Barter Remains Common in International Trade Involving Developing
Nations
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, international barter has become
much less common. Yet, it continues to be an important means of global trade,
especially in transactions with parties from developing nations. An example
of this is the barter transactions involving grain that many developing
countries engaged in during the 2008 spike in grain prices.  When countries95
placed restrictions on the export of grain in order to protect domestic supplies,
they turned to barter in order to trade their grain with other countries.  These96
government-to-government contracts bypassed the export restrictions,97
enabling the parties to trade goods they had surpluses of for goods they had
shortages of without subjecting themselves to the aberrations of the global
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commodities market. For example, in March, 2008, Egypt agreed to trade rice
to Syria in exchange for wheat;  in October, 2008, Thailand agreed to barter98
rice to Iran for Oil;  and as of January, 2009, countries including Russia,99
Malaysia, Vietnam and Morocco had signed or were negotiating such deals for
commodities ranging from rice to vegetable oil.100
Economists with the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization
believe that this type of government-to-government bartering is likely to
become more common due not only to food shortages, but because of the
difficulty of obtaining credit and shortages in countries’ foreign currency
reserves.  The cost of trade credit, which finances goods while in transit, has101
spiked sixfold since the recent financial crisis.  Thus, for many of the same102
reasons, Soviet bloc nations engaged in barter, the current financial crisis has
pushed developing nations to do the same.
Furthermore, barter is commonplace in doing business with nations facing
international sanctions. In addition, enabling parties to circumvent the
sanctions, barter solves a common dilemma facing countries under sanction:
that they have the capacity to produce valuable goods, but since they are
unable to sell them for money, they have very limited stores of foreign
currency with which to make purchases.
This is not always as easy as it sounds. China and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (hereinafter “DRC”) finalized a deal in April, 2008 by
which China would develop billions of dollars of infrastructure in the DRC in
exchange for millions of tons of copper and cobalt.  While this was a means103
for China to procure much needed raw materials and the DRC to get
infrastructure it could not afford otherwise, it also appears to have been
intended to circumvent issues with the DRC’s debt to western lenders.104
Particularly, officials from international lending institutions warned that any
deal resulting in the DRC acquiring new debt would scuttle ongoing
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negotiations for a write-off of the DRC’s debt.  In order to secure debt relief,105
the DRC was later forced to reduce the size of the China deal by three billion
dollars.106
In Myanmar, the ruling junta purchased two billion dollars of military
equipment from China, largely through barter.  While China largely ignores107
the international sanctions against Myanmar,  this arrangement enabled the108
cash-starved junta to purchase equipment that they would not have otherwise
been able to afford. Similarly, barter is a means for businesses in countries
facing sanctions to do business with outsiders despite the lack of trade
financing. For example, Iranian businessmen trade textiles, stones and
petrochemical products to Korean and Chinese parties in exchange for raw
materials.  Countries facing sanctions are not only bartering goods; Cuba has109
resorted to bartering people, in the form of the 30,000 medical personnel it
sent to Venezuela in exchange for 90,000 daily barrels of oil.110
While these barter deals are a means of circumventing international law,
there is some benefit because it can allow these countries to procure the goods
they need to sustain their populations without giving them money to purchase
weapons or line the pockets of corrupt despots. More importantly, they
demonstrate that barter deals still occur frequently in the international arena,
justifying the need for the application of the CISG to barter.
The Future Need to Apply the CISG to Barter Transactions
Beyond barter deals between developing nations, we must be prepared for
the possibility that international barter will become more widespread at some
point in the future. In the event of a sudden global economic change, it is
possible that we could see parties in developed nations engaging in barter
across international borders virtually overnight. If this were to happen, it
would be imperative to have a uniform legal framework to govern these
transactions and the CISG is well suited for this purpose.
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We have already seen this occur at the domestic level in the United
States. Faced with a shortage of credit and excess inventories following the
fall 2008 financial meltdown, many Americans turned to barter.  Use of111
barter networks  skyrocketed and in the San Francisco Bay Area, barter112
listings on Craigslist.org increased by twenty five percent since the start of the
current recession.  Were an analogous situation to develop involving113
international barter, having uniform law would make these transactions more
predictable and less costly. Since we already have an international framework
in the CISG that can effectively govern barter, it only makes sense that it
should be applied to barter transactions.
